



First Practical EEC Guidelinest
Americans traveling in Europe are struck by the signs of familiar res-
taurants, stores, hotels, and car rental agencies. United States franchise
operations have invaded Europe and have been emulated by many
European-based franchises. The Commission of the European Economic
Community (EEC or Community) has indicated that approximately 1,500
business franchises operate in the EEC, a figure slightly higher than in
the United States and nearly four times higher than in Japan. Franchising
could yet account for up to 10 percent of all retail sales within the EEC.
In spite of the importance of franchising within the EEC, the Community
institutions have only now issued the first EEC guidelines.
On January 28, 1986, the European Court of Justice (Court of Justice
or Court) issued its first decision addressing franchise agreements under
the antitrust or "competition" rules of the Treaty of Rome (Treaty). I In
this decision, commonly referred to as Pronuptia,2 the Court held that
franchise agreements that affect trade within the EEC can violate Treaty
article 85(l). But clauses in such agreements necessary to prevent the
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I. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
II (entered into force Jan. I, 1958) [hereinafter Treaty].
2. Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis, [1986] I Common
Mkt. L.R. 414, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,245, [here-
inafter Pronuptia].
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communicated know-how and assistance from aiding the franchisor's
competitors, and those necessary to protect the identity and reputation
of the network, are permissible under article 85(1).
On December 17, 1986, the EEC Commission issued its first two de-
cisions addressing the compatibility of franchise agreements with EEC
competition law. In these decisions, involving Pronuptia 3 and Yves Rocher,4
the Commission applied the Court's ruling to exempt two franchise agree-
ments, pursuant to article 85(3), and to provide concrete guidelines for
franchisees and franchisors with activities in the EEC. On July 13, 1987,
the Commission granted yet another individual exemption, this time for
Computerland's franchise agreements. 5 And on August 27, 1987, the Com-
mission provided further guidance by issuing a draft regulation conferring
a block exemption under article 85(3) for certain franchise agreements.
The Commission anticipates that this regulation will enter into force on
January 1, 1989.
This article begins by providing an overview of EEC competition law.
Then, it analyzes the Court's Pronuptia decision and the franchising
guidelines developed therein. Next, the exemptions under article 85(3)
granted by the Commission to the franchise agreements of Pronuptia,
Yves Rocher, and Computerland are discussed. Finally, this article de-
scribes the draft block exemption for certain franchise agreements.
i. Overview of EEC Competition Law
Competition law in the EEC is governed by Treaty articles 85 and 86.
Article 85(1) provides that agreements (or concerted practices) between
two or more enterprises that restrict competition within the EEC are
prohibited. 6 Article 86 prohibits any enterprise or group of enterprises
3. Re Pronuptia, 30 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 13) 39 (1987) (EEC Commission decision
[hereinafter Re Pronuptia].
4. Re Yves Rocher, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 8) 49 (1987) (EEC Commission decision)
[hereinafter Re Yves Rocher].
5. Re Computerland, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 222) 12 (1987) [hereinafter Re
Computerland].
6. Treaty, supra note I, art. 85(l) provides:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market
... : all agreements between enterprises, any decisions by associations of
enterprises and concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or result the prevention, re-
striction or distortion of competition within the Common Market, and in par-
ticular those consisting in:
" the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
* limitation or control of production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
" market sharing or sources of supply;
" the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of
equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
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from abusing a dominant position within the EEC or in a substantial part
thereof. 7 The location of the parties to the agreement is irrelevant, so
long as the agreement produces its effects within the EEC.
Notwithstanding the general prohibition of article 85(1), an agreement
that restricts competition within the EEC is not prohibited under EEC
competition law if it meets the standards of either the so-called "De
Minimis Notice" 8 or Treaty article 85(3).
The De Minimis Notice, which was issued by the EEC Commission,
defines agreements that have a negligible effect on competition and, thus,
do not infringe article 85(1). According to the Notice, which was last
amended in September 1986, article 85(1) is not violated if (i) the parties
to the restrictive agreement or practice, including their affiliates, have
combined annual gross revenues of under 200,000,000 European units of
account (also referred to as European Currency Units or simply, ECU), 9
and (ii) the products covered by the agreement do not account for more
than 5 percent of the volume in the relevant market, i.e., identical products
(or products considered by consumers to be similar on account of the
properties, price, or use) in that geographic territory of the EEC where
the agreement produces its effects.' 0 Although the Notice is not binding
on the Court of Justice or national courts of the Member States, parties
covered by the Notice need not file or "notify" their agreements with the
Commission and generally are not subject to fines by the Commission.
Thus, parties to a franchise agreement generally should only be concerned
a the subjecting of the conclusion of contracts to the acceptance by a party
of additional supplies which, either by their nature or according to com-
mercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contract.
7. Id. art. 86 provides that any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the Common Market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the Common Market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse
may, in particular, consist in:
* the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or selling prices
or of any other inequitable trading conditions;
e the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the prej-
udice of consumers;
e the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of
supplies, equivalent thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
e the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party
of additional supplies which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
8. Commission Notice of 3 September 1986 on agreements of minor importance which
do not fall under Article 85() of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Com-
munity, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 231) 2 (1986), replacing 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
313) 3 (1977), replacing 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 64) I (1970) [hereinafter De Minimis
Notice].
9. On April I, 1988, one ECU was equal to approximately U.S. $1.24.
10. De Minimis Notice, supra note 8, art. 11.
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with article 85(1) if the Notice's gross revenue and market share standards
cannot be met.
If the franchising parties cannot meet the standards of the De Minimis
Notice, they can seek an exemption from article 85(1) by meeting the
requirements of article 85(3). Pursuant to article 85(3), an agreement (or
concerted practice) that infringes article 85(1) may be granted an individ-
ual exemption if the agreement meets the following four conditions:
" it improves the production or distribution of goods or promotes tech-
nical or economic progress;
" it reserves to consumers a fair share of the resulting economic benefits;
" it contains only indispensable restrictions; and
" it does not eliminate competition altogether.II Only the Commission
has the power to grant exemptions under article 85(3). Subject to a
few narrow exceptions, 12 no individual exemption from the prohi-
bition of article 85(1) can be obtained without prior notification of
the agreement to the Commission.13
Franchising parties should be warned that the consequences of a vio-
lation of article 85(1) are essentially threefold: automatic civil unenforce-
ability of the infringing provisions; 14 exposure of the parties to the violative
agreement to fines imposed by the EEC Commission; 15 and exposure of
11. Treaty, supra note I, art. 85(3) provides:
The provisions of [article 85(I)] may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
-any agreements or classes of agreements between enterprises;
-any decisions or classes of decisions by associations of enterprises;
-any concerted practices or classes of concerted practices;
which contribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of
goods or to the promotion of technical or economic progress, while reserving
to users an equitable share in the profit resulting therefrom, and which:
(a) neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not indispensable
to the attainment of the above objectives;
(b) nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial
portion of the goods concerned.
12. EEC Council, Regulation No. 17/62, First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty, J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 13) 204 (1962), O.J. EUR. COMM. 87 (spec. ed.
1959-62) [hereinafter Regulation 17].
13. Treaty, supra note I, art. 177. In lieu of granting a formal exemption pursuant to
article 85(3), the Commission may issue an administrative letter, often referred to as a
comfort letter, which informs parties that article 85(I) does not seem to apply to a notified
agreement or that an exemption under article 85(3) seems available. Pursuant to Regulation
17, the Commission also may issue a negative clearance, which is a final act akin to a formal
comfort letter in which the Commission states that article 85(l) does not apply to a specific
agreement under the particular facts known to it.
14. Id. art. 85(2) provides: "Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this
Article [85(1)] shall be null and void."
15. Id. art. 87(2)(a) empowers the EEC Council to promulgate regulations "to ensure
observance, by the institution of fines or penalties, of the prohibitions referred to in Article
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the parties to third-party claims for damages. Civil unenforceability may
be declared by the Commission at any time and also may be declared by
a court of a Member State (unless the Commission has granted an indi-
vidual exemption pursuant to article 85(3), described above). The civil
unenforceability provision applies only to those individual elements of
the agreement that fall within the prohibition of article 85(1), provided
that those elements are severable from the agreement as a whole. If the
offending provisions are not severable, then the entire agreement is void
and unenforceable. The law governing the agreement determines which
provisions are severable.
The Commission may impose fines ranging from 1,000 to 1,000,000 ECU
or up to 10 percent of the participating enterprise's annual worldwide
sales of all products from the preceding business year, whichever amount
is higher, on any enterprise that willfully or negligently violates article
85(1) or 86, or violates the terms of a stipulation in an exemption granted
under article 85(3). 16 In fixing the amount of the fine, the Commission
must pay attention both to the gravity and the duration of the infringement.
Only the Commission has the power to fine. Although the Commission
initially made fairly sparing use of this power, in recent cases the Com-
mission has adopted a stricter fining policy. It has not shied away from
extremely severe sanctions when it determines that flagrant violations
have been committed. 17 Regulation 17 of the EEC Council provides for
85, paragraph I and in Article 86 .. " This provision was the authority for Regulation 17,
which granted the Commission the power to enforce the EEC competition rules and spe-
cifically outlined the Commission's power to impose fines and periodic penalty payments.
Regulation 17, supra note 12.
16. Regulation 17, supra note 12, art. 15(2). See also SA Musique Diffusion Frangaise
v. Commission, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1825, 190709, [198313 Common Mkt. L.R. 221,
335-36 (in which the Court upheld the Commission's position that the annual sales test of
Regulation 17 includes worldwide sales of all products) [commonly referred to as and here-
inafter Pioneer].
17. E.g., Re Polypropylene Cartel, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 230) 1 (1986) (the Commission
assessed fines totaling 57.85 million ECU on 15 petrochemical producers, mainly multina-
tionals, which operated a market-sharing and price-fixing cartel in the polypropylene market);
Re AKZO Chemie, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 1 (1985), [1985-1986 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,318 (the Commission assessed a fine of 10,000,000 ECU
on AKZO Chemie for abusing its dominant market position by attempting to drive a smaller
competitor from the market); Re Pioneer Hi-Fi Equipment, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
60) 21, 38 (1980), [1980] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 457, 486-87 (fines assessed on Pioneer and
its distributors amounted to over 7,000,000 ECU), modified sub nom. Pioneer, 1983 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1912, [1983] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 339-40 (the Court reduced the fines
on technical grounds to 3,200,000 ECU). The Court, however, upheld the Commission's
new stricter fining policy: "[T]he fact that the Commission, in the past, imposed fines of a
certain level for certain types of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from raising
that level .. .if that is necessary to ensure the implementation of Community competition
policy." Pioneer, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1906, [1983] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 334.
For a description of the Commission's new stricter fining policy, see EEC COMMISSION,
THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 62-66 (1984).
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automatic immunity from such fines with respect to agreements or prac-
tices actually notified to the Commission with a request for exemption
under article 85(3). In these cases the immunity only extends from the
notification date until the day the Commission issues its decision regarding
article 85(3).18
A party that has been fined by the Commission or that has been denied
an article 85(3) exemption may appeal to the Court of Justice. 19 The Court
also plays a role in competition decisions when a national Member court
requires an interpretation of Community law.20 This situation may arise,
for example as in Pronuptia, when a party to a contract enforcement
action raises the defense that the contract violates article 85(1). In addition
to its authority to issue individual decisions (e.g., Re Pronuptia, Re Yves
Rocher, and Re Computerland), the Commission is authorized to issue
block exemptions to certain categories of agreements 21 that produce an-
ticompetitive effects but that are exempted from the EEC competition
rules because of article 85(3). In the past several years, for example, the
Commission has issued block exemptions for exclusive distributorship, 22
research and development, 23 and patent license agreements. 24 The draft
exemption for franchise agreements is yet another example of a block
exemption.
II. Discussion of the Pronuptia Decision
The Pronuptia case involved a business format franchise agreement
between a French distributor of wedding apparel and one of its German
franchisees. The plaintiff franchisor was a German subsidiary of the French
company, and had sued the German franchisee in Germany for arrears of
fees due under the franchise agreements. The franchisee claimed that no
royalty fees were owed because the underlying franchise agreements were
void as being violative of EEC competition law.
The Pronuptia case reached the Frankfurt Court of Appeals, which
held that the franchise agreements contained restrictions violating Treaty
article 85(1). On appeal, the German Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme
Court) referred the EEC competition issues to the European Court of
Justice under Treaty article 177.
18. Regulation 17, supra note 12, arts. 4, 5, 15(5).
19. Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173; Regulation 17, supra note 12, art. 9(l).
20. Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
21. Id. art. 85(3) allows exemptions for a "category" of agreements, and the EEC Council
has authorized the Commission to issue such group exemptions regarding certain types of
agreements.
22. EEC Commission, Regulation No. 1983/83, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983).
23. EEC Commission, Regulation No. 418/85, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 53) 5 (1985).
24. EEC Commission, Regulation 2349/84, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 219) 15 (1984)
[hereinafter Patent Licensing Regulation].
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In its decision, the Court of Justice considered only distribution fran-
chise agreements, by which the franchisee restricts itself to the sale of
certain products in a shop carrying the franchisor's name. The Court did
not address other types of franchise agreements, such as service 25 and
production franchises. 26
In its analysis, the Court distinguished between clauses that are nec-
essary to enable franchising to function and those that are not. The Court
held that in order to find that a franchise agreement was compatible with
article 85(l), it was necessary to analyze the agreement's content, the
economic context in which it operates, and its economic consequences.
Otherwise stated, the Court predicated its decision on a rule-of-reason
analysis. 27 Set forth below are the guidelines that the Court developed
and a discussion of the clauses permitted under article 85(1) and those
that are violative of article 85(1).
A. CLAUSES PERMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 85(1)
1. Know-How and Assistance
The Court held that under article 85(1) clauses do not restrict compe-
tition if they are essential to preventing the risk that the know-how and
assistance transferred by the franchisor to the franchisee will aid the
franchisor's competitors. These permitted clauses include: 28
e An agreement by which the franchisee is prohibited from selling its
shop without the prior approval of the franchisor. This obligation
ensures the franchisor's right to choose franchisees whose commer-
cial qualifications will maintain the reputation that the franchisor
seeks to protect, and protects the franchisor against the risk that the
know-how transferred to the franchisee will end up in the hands of
a competitor.
25. The Court defined a service franchise agreement as one by which the franchisee offers
services under the sign and trade name, or indeed the trademark, of the franchisor and
complies with the franchisor's directives. Pronuptia, [1986] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. at 442.
26. The Court defined a production franchise agreement as one by which the franchisee
manufactures, according to the franchisor's instructions, products that it sells under the
franchisor's trademark. Id.
27. The debate as to whether the EEC competition rules should be applied under a rule
of reason analysis is well beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that Justice
Joliet, the author of the Pronuptia decision, has advocated the theoretical and practical
merits of a rule of reason approach for over twenty years. R. JOLIET, THE RULE OF REASON
IN ANTI-TRUST LAW (1966). For discussions of this ongoing debate, see, e.g., Forrester &
Norall, The Laicization of Community Law: Self-Help and the Rule of Reason: How Com-
petition Law Is and Could Be Applied, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 11 (1984); Korah,
Pronuptia Franchising: The Marriage of Reason and the EEC Competition Rules, 4 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 99 (1986); Korah, The Rise and Fall of Provisional Validity-The Need
for a Rule of Reason in EEC Antitrust, 3 NW. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 320 (1981).
28. Pronuptia, [1986] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. at 443.
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* The prohibition for the duration of the franchise and for a reasonable
period after its termination on the franchisee from opening a shop
with an identical or similar purpose in an area where the franchisee
would compete with one of the members of the network. This obli-
gation will prevent the franchisee from competing with the franchisor
or another franchisee in respect of products that compete with the
contractual products.
The Court's ruling does not contain any indication as to the geographical
area that could be covered by such a clause. One probably safely can
assume that the entire geographical area of the franchise network could
be covered by the clause. Thus, this noncompetition clause could cover
the entire EEC.
As to the term of the noncompetition clause, the Court in its ruling is
more lenient than the Commission has been in its recent block exemptions.
Under Regulation 67/67, the block exemption for certain exclusive dealing
agreements, the franchisees could require the distributor not to manufac-
ture or distribute competing goods during the entire term of the exclusive
distribution as well as for one year after its termination. Under Regulations
1983/83 and 1984/83, the block exemptions replacing Regulation 67/67, the
validity of noncompetition clauses has been strictly limited to the duration
of the distribution or purchasing agreement.
2. Identity and Reputation
The Court also held that clauses necessary to protect the identity and
reputation of the network do not violate article 85(1). These permitted
clauses include: 29
" The obligation of the franchisee to use the know-how and assistance
of the franchisor, and to apply the commercial methods perfected by
the franchisor. This obligation is designed to assure the uniformity
of quality necessary to maintain customer loyalty to the network.
" The franchisee's obligation to sell only the merchandise covered by
the agreement. This obligation will also help effect consistency of
quality throughout the franchise network.
" The franchisee's obligation to set up and decorate the premises ac-
cording to the franchisor's specifications, which will guarantee a uni-
form image.
" The franchisee's obligation to locate the shop in a place that similarly
conforms to the franchisor's specifications and the prohibition to
relocate the shop without the franchisor's written approval, in order
29. Id. at 443-44.
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to protect the image of the network (e.g., to open up a shop only in
a wealthy or otherwise well-respected area).
* The prohibition against the franchisee's assigning the rights and ob-
ligations under the agreement without the consent of the franchisor.
This prohibition is similar to that against selling the shop without the
franchisor's prior approval.
e The franchisee's obligation to obtain prior approval from the fran-
chisor in regard to advertising, provided that the approval relates
only to the nature of the advertising. This obligation will further
establish uniformity and consistency among the franchise operations,
and will encourage customer loyalty and recognition of the trademark.
Additionally, the Court held that in cases in which it would be impract-
ical for the franchisor to formulate objective quality specifications as to
the merchandise to be sold (as in the case of fashion goods) and in cases
in which the large number of franchisees would make any effective quality
control far too expensive, the franchisor may require the franchisee to
sell only products provided by the franchisor or suppliers selected by it.
However, the agreement must not prohibit the franchisee from acquiring
the contractual products from other franchisees.
B. CLAUSES VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 85(1)
1. Market Division
The Court determined that clauses restrict competition under article
85(1) if they attempt to divide the market between franchisor and fran-
chisee or between two or more franchisees. 30 Thus, a clause effectively
prohibiting the opening of a second shop by requiring the merchandise to
be sold only at the location designated in the agreement violates article
85(1).31 Such a clause must be distinguished from a noncompetition clause
that prevents a franchisee from opening a business connected with a
different franchise network. When the prohibition to open up a second
shop is combined with one in which the franchisor guarantees the fran-
chisee exclusive use of the trademark in a given area, both the franchisor
and other franchisees are prohibited from competing with the franchisee
in the area, thereby creating a market partitioning between the franchisor
and franchisee or among franchisees. This type of market partitioning
30. Id. at 444-45.
31. Although the Court does not clearly so state in Pronuptia, it seems likely that con-
tractual clauses prohibiting the franchise from opening a second shop are anticompetitive
only if such restrictions are not limited to the contractual territory of the franchisee. Or-
dinarily, the radius encompassed by the operating franchise is small.
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was held to be restrictive of competition under article 85(1) in an earlier
Court of Justice decision. 32
The Court appears to be retreating from its judgment in the "Maize
Seed" case,33 in which it ruled that, if neither the licensor nor the licensee
would have entered into the agreement without the exclusive license, the
license itself did not restrict competition and consequently did not violate
article 85(1). In the "Maize Seed" case, however, which involved the
licensing of plant breeders' rights, the technically sophisticated products
and risky market situation were quite different than those in Pronuptia.
Even if the franchise agreement is between enterprises located in one
EEC Member State, the Court ruled, the clause requiring the merchandise
to be sold only at the designated location is capable of affecting trade
between Member States since such clauses prevent franchisees from set-
ting themselves up in another Member State. This statement appears to
be the Court's most extreme interpretation of this essential criterion for
the application of article 85(1).
2. Price Fixing
The Court also held that provisions that impair the franchisee's freedom
to determine its own prices are restrictive of competition. Thus, resale
price fixing clearly violates article 85(1).
The Court added, however, that the mere recommendation of prices
by the franchisor does not restrict competition unless there has been a
concerted practice between the franchisor and franchisee or among fran-
chisees to fix prices. 34 Thus, a risk exists that if all franchisees follow the
franchisor's "nonbinding" price recommendations, their actions could be
regarded as a concerted practice. This risk is difficult to quantify, but at
a minimum, the advisors of parties to EEC franchise agreements should
ensure that the franchise agreements contain no clauses that organize or
encourage the concerting of franchisees' practices with respect to prices.
The Commission's past decision practice suggests that it is highly unlikely
that such clauses could be exempted under article 85(3).
The Court also discussed whether the block exemption under Regu-
lation 67/67 applies to distribution franchise agreements. Regulation
67/67 (currently replaced by Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83) provides a
block exemption from article 85(l) for exclusive distribution agreements.
The Court distinguished distribution franchise agreements from exclusive
32. Consten and Grundig Verkaufs GmbH v. Commission, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
299.
33. L.C. Nungesser KG v. Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015.
34. Pronuptia, [1986] I Common Mkt. L.R. at 445.
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distribution agreements, noting that distribution agreements are defined
by Regulation 67/67 by reference to exclusive supply or purchase, and
not by reference to other elements such as the use of a trademark or
uniform commercial methods, which are characteristic features of a fran-
chise operation. Also, Regulation 67/67 encompasses only exclusive sale
agreements and allows for the imposition of restrictions on only one party
to the contract (the distributor) rather than on both parties, as is the case
with franchise agreements. Thus, the Court held that Regulation 67/67
does not apply to distribution franchise agreements. 35
III. The First Exemptions for Franchise Agreements
Granted by the Commission under Article 85(3)
In response to the Court's Pronuptia decision, the Commission an-
nounced that it planned to issue by mid-1988 at the earliest a regulation
conferring a block exemption under article 85(3) for certain franchise
agreements. To comply with the legislation enabling the Commission to
issue block exemptions, however, the Commission had first to develop
its experience in the franchising field by issuing a number of individual
decisions. 36
Because the judgment of the Frankfurt Court of Appeals in Pronuptia
threatened the enforceability of franchise agreements under EEC com-
petition rules, major franchisors sought to clarify the enforceability of
their franchise agreements. They notified them to the Commission, re-
questing an individual exemption under article 85(3) or a negative clear-
ance from any application of article 85(l). 37 Facing this new inflow of
notifications, the Commission on December 17, 1986 issued its first two
decisions involving notified distribution franchise agreements and on
July 13, 1987, issued a third.
A. RE PRONUPTIA
The first decision dealt once more with the Pronuptia franchise system.
Needless to say, the Commission's Re Pronuptia decision was inspired
by the principles established and guidance given by the Court of Justice
in its earlier judgment.
To assess the Pronuptia franchise system, the Commission began with
a careful analysis of the relevant products and markets. 38 The Commission
35. Id. at 446-47.
36. EEC Council, Regulation No. 19/65, J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 36/533 (1965)), O.J. EUR.
COMM. 35 (spec. ed. 1965-66).
37. Regulation 17, supra note 12, arts. 2, 4.
38. Re Pronuptia, supra note 3, 7-9, at 40.
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confirmed that the clauses under review are not restrictions of competition
if they (i) are indispensable "to prevent the know-how made available
and the assistance given by Pronuptia from benefiting competitors" or
(ii) "provide for the control essential to preserve the common identity
and reputation of the network." 39 (The clauses of Pronuptia's franchise
agreements were described above in the discussion of the Court's
judgment.)
At the Commission's request, Pronuptia had amended its standard form
franchise agreement by putting into writing certain rights that franchisees
allegedly had in practice already, namely, the rights:
" to purchase Pronuptia products from other franchisees;
" to purchase goods not connected with the essential object of the
franchise business from suppliers of their choice, subject to ex post
qualitative review by the franchisor; and
" to set their own retail prices, with the prices circulated by the fran-
chisor being only suggestions and the franchisees merely being rec-
ommended not to exceed the maximum prices quoted by the franchisor
in advertising and promotions. Pronuptia had deleted the clause that
had prohibited the franchisees from harming the brand image of the
franchisor by their pricing levels. 40
In its decision, the Commission focused on two main clauses of the
Pronuptia agreements: those that address noncompetition and territorial
protection.
1. Noncompetition
In the Pronuptia judgment the Court dealt with the compatibility of the
noncompetition clause with article 85(1), but only in rather general terms.
The Court had stated that a noncompetition clause could be accepted for
a reasonable period of time after the termination or expiration of the
agreement. In its decision, however, the Commission had to be more
specific. The Commission cleared the clause that provided that the fran-
chisee would not, directly or indirectly, during the term of the agreement
and for one year after its expiration or termination, engage in any business
in the same area or in any other area where the franchisee would be in
competition with another Pronuptia outlet.
This clearance conforms with the provisions of the block exemption
under former Regulation 67/67 dealing with exclusive distribution agree-
ments, and is more generous than Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83 (which
39. Id. 22-28, at 43-45.
40. Id. 12, at4 1.
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replaced Regulation 67/67), which allow no restrictions upon competition
after expiration or termination of the underlying agreement.
The Commission's favorable approach, however, relies, at least in part,
on the fact that the Pronuptia franchise agreements at issue provided that
the franchisee could continue to carry on business in the allotted territory
after the agreement had ended if the franchisee: (i) had exercised the
franchise for more than ten years; (ii) had discharged its contractual ob-
ligations; and (iii) did not put the know-how and experience it had ac-
cumulated at the service of a competing network. 4 1
2. Territorial Protection
Since the Court had warned that any form of market-sharing clearly
violated article 85(l), the Commission had to decide whether to exempt
under article 85(3) a limited form of territorial protection within the Pron-
uptia franchise system. The approval of such protection was essential for
the further expansion of franchising within the EEC, since prospective
franchisees would probably be unwilling to undertake the necessary in-
vestment and to pay a substantial initial fee to enter the franchise system
if they were not provided with some protection against competition from
other franchisees and the franchisor in the allotted territory.
As explained above, the territorial protection within the Pronuptia fran-
chise network resulted from the combination of two clauses. The first
clause involved the exclusivity granted to the franchisee to operate under
the franchisor's name in a given sales area. The second clause contained
the franchisee's obligation to carry on the franchise business exclusively
from the premises approved for that purpose. The Commission scrutinized
the advantages and the dangers of such protection under the criteria of
article 85(3).
The Commission acknowledged that the intrabrand competition among
franchisees or between franchisor and franchisees would be restricted as
a consequence of the territorial protection granted to each franchisee.
The Commission, however, weighed this restriction of intrabrand com-
petition against the fact that the territorial exclusivity would actually
increase interbrand competition among the other distributors of similar
products.
This element of territorial protection can indeed enhance the strength
of the franchise network when competing with other well-organized dis-
tribution networks. For example, the exclusivity clauses in the franchise
agreement permit the franchisee to make confident forecasts of its future
sales and enable the franchisor both to plan its production more effectively
41. Id. $ 11,at41.
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and to guarantee regular supplies of the products. 42 In this way, the Com-
mission's approval of some degree of market protection could open up
the market to new competitors. By the same token, the franchise system
contributes to improving the production and distribution of the products
concerned.
To be exempted by the Commission, however, the territorial protection
must not be absolute. In the Pronuptia franchises, franchisees still com-
pete with one another because they can sell to (i) any customer whether
resident in the allotted territory or outside it and (ii) any other franchisee. 43
The fact that franchisees may freely buy and sell the products among
themselves further guarantees a workable price competition among fran-
chisees selling at different price levels in the respective Member States
of the EEC. Moreover, since Pronuptia faces competition from a number
of other manufacturers and suppliers in the EEC, Pronuptia does not have
the possibility of eliminating competition for a substantial part of the
products that are part of the relevant product market. 44
The Commission finally determined that the franchise agreements would
entail advantages for consumers. Through the franchise system, the con-
sumers may benefit from a coherent distribution network offering uniform
product quality and a comprehensive range of available articles and
accessories. 4 5
On the basis of the foregoing elements, the Commission granted Pron-
uptia an exemption from the application of article 85(1) until April 21,
1991.
B. RE YVEs ROCHER
In Re Yves Rocher the Commission exempted a system of distribution
franchise agreements very similar to those underlying the Pronuptia fran-
chise system. Because of this similarity, the Re Yves Rocher decision
generally follows the same reasoning as the Pronuptia decision.
Yves Rocher has developed a well-known Franch franchise network
that distributes beauty care products throughout the EEC and beyond.
In its franchise agreements, Yves Rocher grants the franchisee an exclu-
sive right within a defined area to use the franchisor's identifying marks
and know-how with a view to selling its products through a retail outlet.
The franchisor undertakes not to authorize third parties to open another
Yves Rocher beauty center in that territory and not to establish such
42. Id. 34, at 46.
43. Id. 37, at 47.
44. Id.
45. Id. 35, at 46.
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centers there itself. Yves Rocher reserves the right to sell its products to
consumers by other means (in particular by mail order).46
With respect to noncompetition clauses, the Commission cleared the
same provisions as it did in Re Pronuptia. Besides such provisions, the
Yves Rocher agreements permitted the franchisee to acquire financial
interests in the capital of a competitor of Yves Rocher, provided this
investment does not involve the franchisee personally carrying on com-
peting activities. 47
As a result of comments by the Commission, Yves Rocher had deleted
as of December 1, 1986, the resale price maintenance provisions (which
were not applied in practice) contained in the first agreements concluded
when its franchise network was originally set up. This deletion guaranteed
each franchisee the freedom to set its own prices, merely taking into
account the price recommendations of the franchisor. 48
The agreements prohibited each franchisee from selling products even
to other Yves Rocher franchisees. This provision also had been deleted
as of December 1, 1986, as a result of comments by the Commission.
Yves Rocher now authorizes in all agreements cross supplies, both na-
tional and transnational, between its franchisees. 49
In Re Yves Rocher the Commission emphasized that, where any local
advertising by the franchisee must be submitted for the prior approval of
the franchisor, this approval may only concern the nature of the adver-
tising and not the selling prices. 50
As in Re Pronuptia, the Commission pointed out that the Yves Rocher
franchise network resulted in a degree of market sharing between the
franchisor and the franchisees or between franchisees, thereby restricting
competition and violating article 85(l). The Cominission, however, ex-
empted (until January 14, 1992) the clauses establishing this territorial
protection after an analysis of the merits of the franchise system under
the criteria of article 85(3). The Commission, however, conditioned this
exemption on the franchisor's submitting to the Commission each year
its current recommended retail prices and prices payable by the franchi-
sees in the Member States. 5'
C. RE COMPUTERLAND
On July 13, 1987, the Commission granted yet a third individual ex-
emption, for Computerland Europe SA's (CLE) distribution franchise
46. Re Yves Rocher, supra note 4, 19, at 51.
47. Id. 26, at 52.
48. Id. 30, at 53.
49. Id. 31, at 53.
50. Id. 44, at 55.
51. Id. art. 3, at 59.
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network. 52 CLE is a 100 percent subsidiary of Computerland Corporation
of California and has branches in several EEC Member States. Sales
outlets in the EEC approximate seventy-five, with the largest numbers
being in France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. Using the Computerland name, trademarks, and system, CLE fran-
chisees sell to end-users numerous brands of microcomputer products
(hardware, software, and peripheral products) and provide pre- and after-
sales service and, usually, training facilities. CLE assists franchisees in
setting up and running their stores, providing both commercial and tech-
nical know-how.
At the outset, the Commission emphasized that CLE is far from holding
a dominant position in the Community or any Member State. 53 The no-
tified standard form agreement includes the typical clauses with respect
to the franchisee's (i) use of the franchisor's names, trademarks, and
system, (ii) undertaking to devote its best efforts to the operation of the
franchise, and (iii) financial obligations.
The CLE agreement's location clause, however, differs from the typical
clauses found in the Yves Rocher and Pronuptia franchise agreements.
The CLE franchisee must operate its store exclusively at the location
approved in advance by the franchisor, but is not obliged to make "over-
the-counter" sales. This provision means that customers do not actually
have to buy the products in the store itself.
Each CLE franchisee location is surrounded by a "protected area"
having a radius of less than one kilometer after the first year of the agree-
ment (during the first year it is twice that distance), in which no other
CLE outlet may be established. The protected area, however, is not one
of marketing or clientele exclusivity. This means that in spite of the pro-
tected area, any franchisee can sell to any end-user customer wherever
the customer resides or does business. A franchisee also can set up so-
called "satellites," which offer showroom and selling facilities and may
be inside or outside the "mother store's" protected area. For stocking,
servicing, and operational support, however, such satellite outlets remain
dependent on the mother store to which they are contractually linked. 54
Since the CLE franchisees sell numerous brands of microcomputer
products, franchisees are not obliged to purchase their requirements from
CLE. They are permitted to purchase products, however, since CLE
performs a central purchasing function. CLE leaves its franchisees free
to determine their own resale prices, but franchisees may receive rec-
ommended resale price lists from their other sources of supply.
52. Re Computerland, supra note 5.
53. Id. 3, at 13.
54. Id. 7, at 14.
VOL. 22, NO. 3
FRANCHISING IN EUROPE-PRACTICAL EEC GUIDELINES 733
The noncompetition clauses of the CLE standard franchise agreement
provide that during the term of the agreement the franchisee may not
engage or have an interest in any business whose activities include the
sale or service, at retail or wholesale level, of computer hardware, soft-
ware, and related products and services offered by CLE stores. The
franchisee must, however, remain free to invest in a competing enterprise,
provided such investment does not enable it to effectively control such
a business.
Under the agreement as notified, the above noncompetition obligation
continued for three years at a given distance from the ex-franchisee's
former outlet, for two years at a given distance from any CLE store, and
for one year at any location. Following discussions with the Commission
during the notification procedure, CLE conceded that a noncompetition
obligation of one year within a radius of ten kilometers of the ex-
franchisee's former outlet would be sufficient to safeguard the confiden-
tiality of the know-how transmitted to the ex-franchisee during the term
of the agreement. This protection would also be sufficient to allow a new
CLE store to be established and start accumulating goodwill and clientele
in the ex-franchisee's former zone of business activities. 55
Based upon the revised franchise agreement developed by the Com-
mission and CLE, the Commission issued a favorable decision on July
13, 1987. Thus, the Commission's decisions elaborated upon the Court's
Pronuptia decision, and provided the first set of practical guidelines for
franchising in the EEC.
IV. The Draft Block Exemption
Peter Sutherland, the EEC Competition Commissioner, who has re-
peatedly stressed the growing importance of franchising in the Commu-
nity, disclosed in early 1987 the Commission's plans to issue a regulation
conferring a block exemption under article 85(3) for certain franchise
agreements. In a speech delivered on January 27, 1987, to the twenty-
seventh annual convention of the International Franchise Association in
Mexico, Sutherland stated:
Franchising is a natural partner for the Common Market. It is based on the
leverage which an established name or idea can give a relatively small invest-
ment to enable the product or service involved to spread quickly, far and wide.
It makes products and services available to a wide public and does not stop at
local or natural frontiers. . . . Economic growth, employment creation and
consumer satisfaction are goals we all share. The development of the Common
Market in Europe and new technologies and methods of selling goods and
55. Id. 12, at 15.
FALL 1988
734 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
services should come together as a catalyst for industrial and commercial
developments. 56
The Commission already has made great progress with respect to such
a block exemption. On August 27, 1987, the Commission published in the
Official Journal of the European Communities a Draft Regulation (Draft
Regulation) concerning the application of article 85(3) of the Treaty to
"Categories of Franchising Agreements." 57 The Commission has solicited
comments from interested parties and expects the Draft Regulation to be
effective as of January 1, 1989.58 Nevertheless, the history of the EEC
Patent Licensing Regulation demonstrates that many years can pass be-
tween the first draft and the final regulation. 59
Not surprisingly, the Commission favors European Economic Com-
munity-wide franchising agreements as a basic option. This means that,
under such an agreement, all franchisees within the EEC will have access
to and be able to use the "franchise package" in a similar way. It also
means that franchisees must be treated equally throughout the EEC, and
that consumers will find similar products throughout the EEC. The fran-
chise agreement thus cannot be used to fragment the EEC market into
several national markets under the auspices of business imperatives, un-
less such fragmentation can be justified with strong support. The unity
of the EEC market must be preserved from territorial division and price-
fixing.
A. SCOPE OF THE DRAFT REGULATION
The Draft Regulation covers distribution and service franchises, but
excludes manufacturing franchises. The parties to manufacturing fran-
chises will have to continue to rely on individual notification and decisions,
although some of them may be able to benefit from the block exemptions
relating to patent 60 or know-how licenses 61 if they fulfill the conditions
defined by those regulations.
56. Sutherland, Franchise Agreements under EEC Competition Rules, Address delivered
during the Euro-Conferences in Brussels, March 25, 1986, at 3, reprinted in AGENCE EUROPE
Jan. 29, 1987, at 10.
57. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 229) 3 (1987) [hereinafter Draft Regulation].
58. Id. art. 9.
59. The Proposal for a Commission Regulation on the Application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements was issued in 1979 (22 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 58) 12 (1979)), whereas the Patent Licensing Regulation was not effective
until January 1, 1985. See supra note 24. Moreover, the Draft Regulation may be subject
to additional revisions, because its present form has been criticized as, inter alia, "too
restrictive," with economic tests that are "difficult to apply." See, e.g., Clough, Franchising
in Europe Since the Pronuptia Case, II EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 317, 326 (1987).
60. Patent Licensing Regulation, supra note 24.
61. EEC Commission, Draft Regulation on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty
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Article I of the Draft Regulation defines a franchising agreement as an
agreement whereby one undertaking, the franchisor, grants the other, the
franchisee, in exchange for financial consideration, the right to exploit a
franchise for the purpose of marketing determined goods or services. A
"franchise" is defined as a package of intangible property rights relating
to trademarks, trade names, shop signs, utility models, designs, copy-
rights, know-how, or patents, to be exploited for the resale of goods or
the provision of services to end users. Further, a franchise must include
at least (i) the use of a common name or sign and a uniform presentation
of contract premises, (ii) communication by the franchisor to the fran-
chisee of substantial know-how capable of conferring a competitive ad-
vantage on the latter, and (iii) continuous provision by the franchisor to
the franchisee of commercial or technical assistance during the life of the
agreement. Finally, "know-how" is defined as nonpatented practical
knowledge 62 relating to the sale of goods or the provision of services to
end users, and in particular, to the presentation of goods for sale, the
processing of goods in connection with the provision of services, methods
of dealing with customers, and administration and financial management.
The Draft Regulation also includes master franchise agreements.
The form of the Draft Regulation is patterned on the Patent Licensing
Regulation. 63 Thus, the Draft Regulation distinguishes three groups of
clauses: (i) the "permitted list," consisting of clauses that may infringe
article 85(1) but are exempted; (ii) the "white list," including clauses that
are common to franchises, but generally do not infringe article 85(1) and
are worthy of exemption in those cases in which they do; and (iii) the
"black list," describing clauses that generally restrict competition and
will prevent the granting of a block exemption under the Draft Regulation.
Franchise agreements that contain clauses described only in the "per-
mitted list" or the "white list" and none included in the "black list" are
automatically exempted from article 85(1) of the Treaty (assuming the
conditions of article 4 are met as described below). As such, these agree-
ments need not be notified to the Commission. 64
to Certain Categories of Know-how Licensing Agreements, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
214) 2 (1987) [hereinafter Draft Know-how Regulation]. The Commission anticipates that
the Draft Know-how Regulation will be effective as of July I, 1988.
62. The Draft Know-how Regulation defines know-how as nonpatented "'technical in-
formation." Id. 2.
63. For a discussion of the Patent Licensing Regulation, see generally Coleman & Schmitz,
The EEC Patent Licensing Regulation-Practical Guidelines, 42 Bus. LAW. 101 (1986).
64. The Draft Regulation, however, exempts a franchise agreement only from art. 85(1);
art. 86 and its prohibition against abuses of a dominant position still apply to franchise
agreements.
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B. PERMISSIBLE CLAUSES
The "permitted list" of clauses that may infringe article 85(1), but which
are exempted, is in article 2 of the Draft Regulation and consists of four
permitted restrictions on competition. 65 First, limited territorial protection
to the franchisee is permitted by restricting a franchisor from licensing
all or part of the franchise to third parties or from exploiting, itself, the
franchise in the contract territory. Such limited territorial protection, which
grants the franchisee exclusivity within the contract territory, is indis-
pensable to protect the franchisee's investment and to guarantee that it
will concentrate its activity on the contract territory. Second, the "per-
mitted list" also includes a location clause, an obligation on the franchisee
to exploit the franchise only from the contract premises. Third, the fran-
chisee may be required to sell the franchised goods only to end users or
other franchisees. Finally, the franchisee may be prohibited from selling
competing goods in the franchised territory or in territories allocated to
other members of the franchise network.
Article 3 includes the "white list"--a nonexhaustive 66 list of the fol-
lowing fourteen obligations that are common to franchise agreements but
not restrictive of competition: 67
* an obligation on the franchisee to sell exclusively goods matching minimum
objective quality specifications laid down by the franchisor, insofar as nec-
essary to protect the franchisor's know-how or to maintain the common
identity and reputation of the franchisor's know-how or to maintain the
common identity and reputation of the franchised network;
* an obligation on the franchisee to purchase the goods exclusively from the
franchisor or third parties designated by it, but only if necessary to protect
the franchisor's know-how or to maintain the common identity and reputation
and only for products for which it is impracticable to formulate objective
quality specifications; only clauses I and 2 require that the restrictions be
necessary to protect the franchisor's know-how or to maintain the common
identity and reputation;
" a prohibition on the franchisee from engaging, directly or indirectly, in any
similar business in a territory where it would compete with a member of the
franchised network; thus, if the franchised network included all of the EEC,
65. Because the following four clauses are in the order listed in art. 2 of the Draft
Regulation, citations have been omitted.
66. Draft Regulation, supra note 57, recital 1I. A list of additional clauses that are common
to franchise agreements but generally not restrictive of competition can be found in Re
Computerland, supra note 5, 24, at 19.
67. Because the following fourteen obligations are in the order listed alphabetically in
art. 3 of the Draft Regulation, citations have been omitted.
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this noncompetition clause could cover the entire EEC; however, unlike the
Court's Pronuptia decision68 and the Commission's three individual fran-
chising decisions, 69 all of which permitted a noncompetition restriction for
the term of the franchise agreement plus one year after its termination, the
Draft Regulation limits the noncompetition restriction to the term of the
agreement;
* a prohibition on the franchisee from using, during the life of the agreement
and after its termination, the know-how and intellectual property rights li-
censed by the franchisor for the exploitation of the franchise; such prohibition
must expire, however, when the know-how no longer confers a competitive
advantage to the franchisee;
" a prohibition on the franchisee, during the life of the agreement and after its
termination, from disclosing the know-how provided by the franchisor, and
an obligation to impose the same restriction on its staff; clauses 4 and 5 are
intended to prevent the know-how and assistance provided by the franchisor
from benefiting competitors;
" an obligation on the franchisee to inform the franchisor of infringements on
the licensed intellectual property rights, to take legal action against infringers,
or to assist the franchisor in any legal actions against infringers; however,
this obligation cannot prevent the franchisee from challenging the validity of
the intellectual property rights that form part of the franchise;
* an obligation on the franchisee to attend or have its staff attend training
courses arranged by the franchisor;
" an obligation on the franchisee to use its best endeavors to sell the goods or
provide the services that are the subject of the franchise, achieve a minimum
gross revenue, plan its orders in advance, keep minimum stocks, and provide
customer and warranty services;
* an obligation on the franchisee to pay to the franchisor a specified proportion
of its revenue for advertising and obtain the franchisor's approval for the
advertising it carries out itself; this obligation encourages trademark rec-
ognition and customer loyalty;
" an obligation on the franchisee to apply the commercial method devised by
the franchisor and use the licensed know-how, trademarks, and signs;
" an obligation on the franchisee to comply with the franchisor's standards for
the equipment and general appearance of the contract premises; clauses 10
and I I can be used to protect the identity and reputation of the network and
guarantee a uniform image;
* an obligation on the franchisee to comply with the franchisor's standards for
the equipment and general appearance of the contract premises; clauses 10
and I I can be used to protect the identity and reputation of the network and
guarantee a uniform image;
" an obligation on the franchisee to allow the franchisor to carry out checks
on its inventory, accounts, and contract premises;
68. Pronuptia, [1986] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. at 443.
69. Re Pronuptia, supra note 3, 25(i), at 44; Re Yves Rocher, supra note 4, 48, at 56;
Re Computerland, supra note 5, 12, at 15, 22(ii), at 17.
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* a prohibition on the franchisee from changing the location of the contract
premises without the franchisor's consent; and
* a prohibition on the franchisee from assigning the rights and obligations under
the franchise agreement without the franchisor's consent; the last two clauses
are intended to protect the image and the quality reputation of the network
and to prevent the know-how provided by the franchisor from benefiting
competition. 70
These "white clauses" are generally not restrictive of competition, but
if, because of particular circumstances, any of them (e.g., the noncom-
petition clause) do fall within article 85(1), they still are exempted. 7'
As stated above, franchise agreements that contain clauses described
only in the "permitted list" or the "white list" and none included in the
"black list" are automatically exempted from article 85(1) of the Treaty.
Article 4 of the Draft Regulation, however, states that the block exemption
applies only if four conditions are met. 72
The first condition is that interfranchisee sales must be possible, or if
the franchise network is combined with a selective distribution system,
the franchisee must be free to obtain goods from approved distributors.
This possibility of parallel imports (i) guarantees a workable price com-
petition among franchisees selling at different price levels in the respective
Member States of the EEC, (ii) prevents the elimination of competition
for a substantial part of the franchised products, and (iii) prevents the
territorial protection of the franchisees from becoming absolute. 73
The second condition states that if the franchisor obliges the franchisee
to honor guarantees for the products that are the subject of the franchise,
this obligation must also apply to such products supplied by other fran-
chisees. This condition is a fairness requirement, ensuring that all con-
sumers receive a fair share of the resulting benefits.
Third, even if franchisees can be prohibited from competing with the
franchisor,74 they must always remain free to invest in competing com-
70. The last three clauses also must be read in conjunction with art. 8(d) of the Draft
Regulation, which permits the Commission to withdraw the block exemption if the franchisor
exercises its rights under those three clauses for reasons other than to verify that the
franchisor abides by its obligations under the agreement.
71. Draft Regulation, supra note 57, art. 3(2).
72. Because the following four conditions are in order listed in art. 4 of the Draft Reg-
ulation, citations have been omitted.
73. Limited territorial protection is permitted pursuant to the Draft Regulation, supra
note 57, art. 2(a).
74. Certain noncompetition clauses are permitted pursuant to id. arts. 3(c), (d).
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panies when they are not involved personally in carrying on competing
activities, in particular, when they do not have control or are not a member
of the governing board.
The last condition states that the parties must describe in the contract
or any related document, in as much detail as possible, the know-how
and other rights that are the subject of the franchise. 75
C. IMPERMISSIBLE CLAUSES
The "black list" of article 5 enumerates six clauses or circumstances
that will prevent the Draft Regulation's exemption from applying to the
franchise agreement, namely when:
76
* manufacturers of identical or equivalent goods enter into reciprocal fran-
chising agreements for the distribution of such goods; this prohibition on
reciprocal franchising agreements is intended to prevent market division by
manufacturers or distributors of similar goods;
" the franchisee is prohibited from obtaining supplies of goods of equivalent
value to those offered by the franchisor, for reasons other than protecting
the franchisor's know-how or maintaining the common identity and repu-
tation of the franchise network;
" the franchisee is obliged to sell goods manufactured by the franchisor or
designated third parties, and the franchisor refuses, without objectively valid
reasons, to designate third parties proposed by the franchisee;
* the franchisee is restricted, directly or indirectly, from determining the resale
prices for the products or services that are the subject of the franchise; this
resale price maintenance clause is one of the main obstacles for the appli-
cation of the exemption; specifically, Commissioner Sutherland has stated
that "price competition should not only never be excluded, but should be
safeguarded as much as possible";77 nonetheless, based upon Pronuptia,78
Re Pronuptia,7 9 and Re Yves Rocher,80 retail price recommendations or sug-
gestions may be permitted, unless the franchisor and franchisee, by concerted
practice, fix resale prices based upon such recommendations or suggestions;
" the franchisee is prohibited from challenging the validity of the intellectual
property rights that form part of the franchise; this impermissible clause is
in the "black list" of the Patent Licensing Regulation, which also provides,
however, that the licensor may retain the right to terminate the licensing
agreement in the event of such a challenge; 8' and
75. This requirement appears less onerous than the one imposed in art. 1(3) of the Draft
Know-How Regulation, which requires that the parties not only describe the transferred
know-how in detail but also maintain detailed records of any subsequent improvements
thereto.
76. Because the following six clauses or circumstances are in the order listed in art. 5 of
the Draft Regulation, citations have been omitted.
77. Sutherland, supra note 56, at 3.
78. Pronuptia, [1986] I Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 445.
79. Re Pronuptia, supra note 3, 26, at 44.
80. Re Yves Rocher, supra note 4, 51, at 57.
FALL 1988
740 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
* one or both of the parties is prohibited from supplying the products or services
to end users because of their place of residence; such a clause is not exempt
because it would contribute to an absolute territorial protection of the fran-
chisees when added to the limited territorial protection clause. 82
If a franchise agreement that may restrict or distort competition within
the EEC includes any clause from the "black list," the agreement must
be notified to the Commission by filing Form A/B (which has been revised
as of January 1, 198683) with the Commission's Directorate of Competition
in Brussels, Belgium. 84 The Commission will review the agreement to
determine if it infringes article 85(1). If so, the Commission will decide
whether the agreement qualifies for an article 85(3) exemption. Based
upon Commission and Court decisions, however, any clause on the "black
list" will likely be found to violate article 85(1) and will probably not
qualify for an article 85(3) exemption. Thus, every effort should be made
to avoid the inclusion in franchise agreements of clauses included in the
"black list" unless the De Minimis exemption is applicable, or the risks
of doing so have been carefully weighed.
D. PROCEDURE
Article 6 provides for an "opposition procedure," which was first in-
cluded in the Patent Licensing Regulation. 85 Pursuant to this procedure,
the exemption may be extended to franchise agreements containing re-
strictions of competition that are not in the "permitted list" or the "white
list" but do not fall within the "black list," provided that the agreement
is notified to the Commission on Form A/B. The information provided to
the Commission must be complete, and the notification must refer ex-
pressly to this article of the Draft Regulation. If the Commission raises
no objection within six months, the notified agreement will receive an
automatic exemption.
81. Patent Licensing Regulation, supra note 24, art. 3(I).
82. Limited territorial protection is permitted pursuant to the Draft Regulation, supra
note 57, art. 2(a).
83. EEC Commission, Regulation No. 2526/85, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 240) 1 (1985).
84. For a good discussion of Community competition procedure, see C. KERSE, EEC
ANTITRUST PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1988) (updated with supplements).
85. Patent Licensing Regulation, supra note 24, art. 4.
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The Member States will receive a copy of the notification, and the
Commission is required to oppose an exemption if it receives a request
from a Member State within three months after the notification copy is
sent to the Member States.
The Commission may withdraw its opposition at any time, but if the
exemption is being opposed upon request of a Member State, the Com-
mission's opposition may be withdrawn only after consultation with the
Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions.8 6
If the Commission withdraws its opposition because it concludes that the
original agreement fulfills the requirements of article 85(3), then the ex-
emption is effective from the date of notification. If its opposition is
withdrawn based upon the parties' amendment to the agreement, however,
the exemption dates only from the date upon which the amendment was
effective.8 7 If the Commission fails to withdraw its opposition, the pro-
visions of Regulation 17 shall govern the effects of the notification.
Even though the Draft Regulation grants a blanket exemption to a group
of agreements, the Commission has reserved the power to withdraw such
an exemption in certain situations. Article 8 outlines such cases, which are
those in which access to, or competition within, a particular market is sub-
stantially restricted. In particular, the Commission may withdraw an ex-
emption if territorial protection is awarded to the franchisee and: 88
* access to the relevant market is difficult because of the cumulative effect of
franchise networks created by competing manufacturers or distributors;
* the franchise products or services do not face, within the contract territory,
effective competition from identical goods or goods considered as equivalent
by the users;
* the parties prevent the end users from obtaining the franchise goods and
services because of their place of residence;
* the franchisor uses its right to check the franchisee's inventory and accounts,
or refuses its agreement to requests by the franchisee to move the contract
premises or assign his rights and obligations under the franchise agreement,
for reasons other than verifying that the franchisee abides by its obligations
under the agreement.
E. EFFECTIVE DATE
Finally, the Draft Regulation is intended to enter into force on
January 1, 1989, for an initial term of eleven years.
89
86. Draft Regulation, supra note 57, art. 6(6).
87. Id. arts. 6(7), 6(8).
88. Because the following four circumstances are in the order listed in art. 8 of the Draft
Regulation, citations have been omitted.
89. Draft Regulation, supra note 57, art. 9.
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V. Conclusion
The Court's Pronuptia decision provided an important first step toward
the clarification of the legality of franchise agreements within the EEC.
The Commission provided further clarification in its decisions addressing
the Yves Rocher, Pronuptia, and Computerland franchise networks. The
Draft Regulation advances the certainty as to the compatibility of fran-
chise agreements with EEC law, yet another step. Together these Court
and Commission actions have provided the first set of guidelines for parties
franchising within the EEC.
Clearly, these first decisions of the Court and the Commission and the
Draft Regulation have met the expectations of franchisors as to the future
of their business involvement within the EEC, especially with respect to
the territorial protection granted to each franchisee. These developments
should be heartening to those in the franchise field, as well as to the
consumers located in the EEC.
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